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FIGHTING AN UPHILL BATTLE: RECONCILING UNPAID
CONTRIBUTIONS OF MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLANS
WITH THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S
DEFALCATION PROVISION
Five circuit courts have determined whether an employer’s unpaid
contributions due under an employee benefit plan can be classified as plan
assets under ERISA. When unpaid contributions are plan assets, the individual
exercising authority or control over the assets is imputed fiduciary status
under ERISA and, in turn, owes certain fiduciary duties and obligations to the
employee benefit funds. If the fiduciary fails to make the required
contributions, thereby breaching his or her duties under ERISA, then he or she
becomes personally liable for the unpaid contributions. In bankruptcy, this
result means that the unpaid contributions would be a nondischargeable debt if
the court holds the individual liable for defalcation.
In 2005, the Tenth Circuit was the first circuit to address whether unpaid
contributions can be plan assets in a bankruptcy proceeding. Subsequently, in
2007 and 2015, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits decided this issue within the
bankruptcy context and elected to either follow the Tenth Circuit’s guidance or
deviate slightly to reach an identical final result, making the unpaid
contributions a dischargeable debt.
A circuit split now exists. On the one hand, the two circuits that decided
this issue in nonbankruptcy proceedings have either (1) held an individual
liable as an ERISA fiduciary for the unpaid contributions; or (2) recognized
the potential to hold an individual liable for the unpaid contributions under the
right set of circumstances. On the other hand, the three circuits that decided
this issue in bankruptcy have either (1) failed to classify unpaid contributions
as plan assets; or (2) failed to extend ERISA’s definition of “fiduciary” into
the bankruptcy context, ultimately finding that the debts are dischargeable in
bankruptcy.
This Comment seeks to reconcile the circuit split by proposing a three-step
approach that will allow courts determining this issue in bankruptcy
proceedings to mirror their counterparts while still protecting and preserving
the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code. Adopting this approach will bring clarity to
a muddled and complex area of the law and ensure that dishonest debtors are
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held accountable under § 523(a)(4) for their willful and conscious disregard of
the fiduciary duties owed to dependent employees.
INTRODUCTION
Millions of Americans depend on employer contributions to employee
benefit funds as a means of achieving their retirement savings goals.1
Employer contributions represent “more than 35% of the total contributions on
average to an employee’s workplace savings account.”2 Employees place such
a high value on employer contributions that 43% admitted “they would settle
for lower pay if it meant they received a higher employer contribution to their
retirement plan accounts.”3 Further, “only 13% [of employees] sa[id] they
would take a job with no company match, even if it came with a higher pay
level.”4
Dependence upon employer contributions may help explain why 64% of
Americans are concerned about not having enough money for retirement.5
Gallup notes that “[s]ince [it] began polling Americans in 2001 about their
financial concerns, a majority have continually been worried about not being
able to afford retirement—the top overall concern in each of those 16 years.”6
These statistics suggest “that saving for retirement disquiets Americans in both
good and bad economic times.”7 When employers fail to hold up their end of
the bargain and become unable or unwilling to make the promised
contributions, employees are often left frustrated and in need of legal
assistance.8
With respect to multiemployer pension plans, “the amount of the
employer’s contribution is usually set by a collective bargaining agreement

1

See Introduction to Multiemployer Plans, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., http://www.pbgc.gov/
prac/multiemployer/introduction-to-multiemployer-plans.html
(last
visited
Sept. 21, 2016);
Kevin McGuinness, Employer Contributions Important to Employee Retirement Savings, PLANSPONSOR
(Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.plansponsor.com/Employer_Contributions_Important_to_Employee_Retirement_
Savings.aspx.
2 McGuinness, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See Justin McCarthy, Americans’ Financial Worries Edge Up in 2016, GALLUP (Apr. 28, 2016),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/191174/americans-financial-worries-edge-2016.aspx.
6 Id.
7 Andrew Dugan, Retirement Remains Americans’ Top Financial Worry, GALLUP (Apr. 22, 2014),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/168626/retirement-remains-americans-topfinancial-worry.aspx.
8 See Introduction to Multiemployer Plans, supra note 1.
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that specifies a contribution formula (such as $3 per hour worked by each
employee covered by the agreement) and further provides that contributions
must be paid to the plan on a monthly basis.”9 If an employer fails to make the
required contributions, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”) “permits the plan to sue and obtain the delinquency plus interest,
liquidated damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney fees.”10 Additionally,
many courts have imputed fiduciary duties to employers in their individual
capacities for failing to make the required contributions where the governing
agreements specifically classify all employer contributions as plan assets.11
Despite such rulings, the majority rule is that an employer’s unpaid
contributions are not plan assets.12 When the unpaid contributions are not plan
assets, the employer is not liable for the contributions as an ERISA fiduciary.13
The circuit courts are divided on the issue of what constitutes a plan asset
when dealing with unpaid contributions. Three circuits have held that the
unpaid contributions themselves can be a plan asset.14 These courts found that
the individuals who had failed to make contributions to the employee benefit
funds may be ERISA fiduciaries.15 Two other circuits have held that the
contractual right to bring a claim with respect to the unpaid contributions is the
plan asset; the unpaid amounts themselves are not.16 These circuits refrained
from imputing ERISA fiduciary status to the employers.17
When this issue arises in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, the circuit
courts split once again, but in a different way. While the circuits deciding this
issue outside of bankruptcy interpret ERISA broadly, expanding the traditional
understanding of what it means to be a “fiduciary,”18 the circuits deciding this
issue within the bankruptcy context recognize fiduciary status in very limited

9

Id.
Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (2012).
11 See, e.g., Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry & Constr., LLC, 779 F.3d
182, 184 (2d Cir. 2015); ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011, 1012 (11th Cir. 2003).
12 See Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1233, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i).
14 See Moulton Masonry, 779 F.3d at 184–88; Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012; see also Bd. of Trs. v. Bucci (In re
Bucci), 493 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir. 2007) (“For the sake of argument, the court will assume that the unpaid
employer contributions here qualified as ERISA plan assets.”).
15 See Moulton Masonry, 779 F.3d at 188–89; Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012–16.
16 See Bos v. Bd. of Trs., 795 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2015); Navarre v. Luna (In re Luna), 406 F.3d
1192, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005).
17 See Bos, 795 F.3d at 1010–12; In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1203–04.
18 See Moulton Masonry, 779 F.3d at 188–89; Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012–15.
10
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circumstances and interpret the definition of “fiduciary” narrowly.19 In other
words, courts have been reluctant to impute fiduciary duties to employers
when bankruptcy proceedings accompany the otherwise identical factual
scenarios.20 Thus, when a company owner in control of company finances files
for bankruptcy in his or her individual capacity, the unpaid contributions are
often dischargeable. This result leaves employees without a remedy.21 Because
of the increasing amount of unpaid contributions and inconsistent judicial
opinions, support for private pension reform has been rising steadily.22
While the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) is to provide a
fresh start for the debtor by discharging contractual debts, thereby relieving the
debtor of those obligations, the Code does not provide such relief for dishonest
debtors who have engaged in fraudulent conduct.23 This concept is hardly
novel, and one would be hard pressed to find a court that would hold
otherwise. By deviating from the reasoning of their counterparts, however,
courts deciding this issue in bankruptcy are sidestepping ERISA and
facilitating discharges for potentially dishonest debtors who have breached
their fiduciary duties to employees. Thus, the conflict that the courts have
created is illogical and further complicates an already complex area of the law.
Although ERISA plans “are just too complex and varied for everyone to
understand” and “[e]mployees and plan participants cannot be expected to
know all the ins and outs governing their ERISA plans,”24 it should be
understood that “fiduciaries—the people who run and manage the plans—have
certain obligations to plan participants . . . [and] when they breach their
fiduciary duty—employees can file an ERISA lawsuit to attempt to recover
their missing funds.”25 By refraining to impute fiduciary duties to employers
19 See Bos, 795 F.3d at 1010–12; In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 637 (embracing the exception to the general
rule that unpaid contributions are not plan assets but declining to recognize “a debtor’s status as an ERISA
fiduciary as alone being sufficient . . . for purposes of § 523(a)(4)”); In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1203–04.
20 See, e.g., Bos, 795 F.3d at 1010–12; In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 641–43; In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1197.
21 See, e.g., Bos, 795 F.3d at 1012; In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 637–38; In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1197.
22 See generally Mark Miller, Why Congress Needs to Reform Multi-Employer Pension Plans Now,
REUTERS (July 31, 2014, 9:10 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/31/us-column-miller-pensionsidUSKBN0G01IM20140731#KXvl2fggeif3rgpE.97 (explaining that “[p]olicymakers, legislators, business and
labor groups have debated the issue for two years . . . [i]f Congress doesn’t act this year, it is very likely that
major plans will fail and the multi-employer system will collapse”).
23 See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393
(1985).
24 Heidi
Turner,
Understanding
ERISA
Laws
Complicated
to
Understand,
LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM (Aug. 12, 2012), https://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/articles/stock_
option/erisa-plan-lawsuit-retirement-employee-3-17970.html#.VoRlm5OAOko.
25 Id.
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who file for bankruptcy, courts have further, and unnecessarily, muddled
ERISA law. If courts were to adopt a systematic approach that takes into
account the totality of the circumstances surrounding each individual case, it
would produce two effects. First, courts would be able to hold individual
employers accountable for breaching their fiduciary duties. Second, courts
would still be able to preserve the public policy concern of protecting honest
debtors in bankruptcy proceedings.
This Comment will focus primarily on the bankruptcy component of the
circuit split and will remain agnostic to all other aspects of the split. That is to
say, this Comment will assume it is possible for unpaid contributions to be
plan assets. This Comment will begin by discussing the history of
multiemployer pension plans, while also providing insight on ERISA reforms.
Next, this Comment will compare the broad interpretation “fiduciary” receives
under ERISA with the narrow interpretation “fiduciary” receives under the
Code by discussing the decisions of the circuit courts that have decided
whether an individual can be held personally liable for an employer’s unpaid
contributions. Finally, this Comment will propose a three-step approach courts
should adopt when determining the dischargeability of unpaid contributions.
First, when the governing agreement between the parties unambiguously
categorizes unpaid contributions as plan assets, courts should defer to the
contractual intent of the parties and recognize unpaid contributions as plan
assets. Second, courts should presume that “fiduciary” has a consistent
meaning under both ERISA and the Code. Third, courts should determine the
dischargeability of unpaid contributions under § 523(a)(4) in a bankruptcy
proceeding on a case-by-case basis after evaluating the totality of the
circumstances.
I. BACKGROUND
Pension law is no stranger to the old adage, “It gets worse before it gets
better.” A series of incidents arose throughout the twentieth century that set the
stage for ERISA’s enactment in 1974. Before discussing these incidents,
however, it is important to understand the structure of a multiemployer pension
plan.

GRIFFIN GALLEYSPROOFS2

318

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

12/15/2016 3:16 PM

[Vol. 33

A multiemployer pension plan is a “retirement plan negotiated by a union
with a group of employers typically in the same industry.”26 Multiemployer
plans are most prominent among either small companies that do not establish
their own employee benefit plans or “industries in which, because of seasonal
or irregular employment and high labor mobility, few workers would qualify
under an individual company’s plan if one were established.”27 These plans
“allow employees who move among employers within unionized industries—
such as trucking, construction and grocery-store chains—to participate in the
same retirement plan negotiated under either separate or common collective
bargaining agreements.”28 The collective bargaining agreements (“CBA”)
govern the terms of multiemployer plans and state “how much the employers
must contribute to the plans for their employees.”29 Under most agreements,
employers “participating in the same multiemployer plan often make equal
contributions.”30 Thus, if two employers contribute to the same plan and one
stops making payments, the plan could become underfunded quickly.31 The
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a federal agency created under ERISA
to maintain private pension plans, estimates that “multiemployer pension plans
covering about 1.5 million people are severely underfunded.”32 One major
contributing factor to the insolvency of these plans is company bankruptcies.33
The earliest multiemployer pension plans were not created by CBAs.34
Instead, they were “solely administered by unions” and served to strengthen
the power of unions.35 With little federal regulation, unions were able to abuse
their control over plans in two ways. First, unions would opportunistically
access plan components during emergencies such as workers’ strikes. Second,

26 Facts About Multiemployer Pension Plan Funding, PENSION RTS. CENT. (May 29, 2014), http://www.
pensionrights.org/publications/fact-sheet/facts-about-multiemployer-pension-plan-funding (last visited Jan. 23,
2016).
27 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS (2009), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/
publications/books/fundamentals/fund14.pdf.
28 Overview of Multiemployer Plans, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-011-006.html#d0e107
(last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
29 Facts About Multiemployer Pension Plan Funding, supra note 26.
30 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 27.
31 See Facts About Multiemployer Pension Plan Funding, supra note 26.
32 PBGC Report Shows Improvement in Single-Employer Plans, but Underscores Increased Risks to
Some Multiemployer Plans, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP. (June 30, 2014), http://www.pbgc.gov/
news/press/releases/pr14-08.html.
33 Facts About Multiemployer Pension Plan Funding, supra note 26.
34 Harriet Weinstein & William Wiatrowski, Multiemployer Pension Plans, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Spring
1999, at 19, 20, http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/multiemployer-pension-plans.pdf.
35 Id.
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they would mandate that employees be in “good standing” within the union to
gain access to the plans.36 Thus, employees were at the mercy of unions, and
they had nowhere else to turn to secure future benefits for themselves and their
families.37
Following World War II, the federal government implemented several
policies to curb inflation that ended up sparking pension reform and
“spur[ring] the creation of private pension plans.”38 The first of these policies
was the passage of “favorable tax regulations [that] made pension plans less
expensive for employers by allowing them to deduct, as a business expense,
contributions made to pension plans when computing their tax returns.”39 In
addition, “wage stabilization efforts imposed a ceiling on wage increases to
reduce inflationary pressures, but employee benefits, including pensions, were
exempt.”40 Perhaps most importantly, however, in 1948 the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the National Labor Relations Board’s order mandating that pension
and insurance benefits be determined through collective bargaining.41 With this
decision, the playing field between employers and employees was finally
beginning to even out.
In the midst of progress, 1964 brought the infamous collapse of the
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and “the inadequately funded pension plan
did not have enough assets to finance the benefits owed to over 7,000
employees.”42 When Studebaker fell, “a number of abuses in pension plan
structure became public.”43 For example, “[u]nreasonably high vesting
thresholds prevented long-time workers from qualifying for benefits” and the
pension rules defined “unbroken service” too narrowly.44 Furthermore, “courts
[had been] uph[olding] practices of employers by reserving their rights to
modify, decrease, or deny benefits or eliminate pensions at will.”45 These
practices allowed employers to escape “a number of liabilities by asserting in
36

Id.
See id.
38 Sarah Steers, ERISA History, JURIST (Oct. 4, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://jurist.org/feature/2013/10/erisahistory.php.
39 Weinstein & Wiatrowski, supra note 34, at 20.
40 Id.
41 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251, 255 (7th Cir. 1948); see also Weinstein & Wiatrowski,
supra note 34, at 20.
42 Steers, supra note 38.
43 Karen A. Zurlo, Private Pension Protections Since ERISA: The Expanded Role of the Individual, 39 J.
SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 49, 53 (2012).
44 Id.
45 Id.
37

GRIFFIN GALLEYSPROOFS2

320

12/15/2016 3:16 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

plan documents that workers were claiming benefits against the plan, and not
against the assets of the corporation.”46 Thus, courts were getting it wrong and
many commentators suggested that “Studebaker’s bankruptcy highlighted the
need for federal legislation to amend pension plan abuses and protect workers
from corporate bankruptcy.”47 The stage was now set for ERISA’s debut.
A. ERISA’s Application in Nonbankruptcy Proceedings
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to set minimum standards for voluntarily
established pension plans and to provide protection for individuals in these
plans.48 In other words, an employer does not have to set up a pension plan for
its employees. If the employer chooses to do so, however, “it is held to certain
specific minimum standards.”49 Federal courts have agreed that ERISA is “a
remedial statute deserving of broad construction.”50 ERISA “applies to
virtually all private-sector corporations, partnerships, and proprietorships,
including non-profit corporations—regardless of their size or number of
employees.”51
ERISA requires that a voluntary pension plan contain certain provisions,
including
provid[ing] participants with plan information . . . about plan features
and funding; provid[ing] fiduciary responsibilities for those who
manage and control plan assets; require[ing] plans to establish a
grievance and appeals process . . . and giv[ing] participants the right
to sue for benefits and breaches of fiduciary duty.52

ERISA defines a “fiduciary” as any individual that “exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or

46

Id.
Steers, supra note 38; see Zurlo, supra note 43, at 52–53.
48 Health Plans & Benefits: ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/healthplans/erisa.htm (last visited July 13, 2016).
49 Steers, supra note 38.
50 ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011, 1015 (11th Cir. 2003); see Teamsters Joint Council No. 83
v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 123 (4th Cir. 1991); see also LoPresti v. Terwilliger, 126 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir.
1997) (holding that an individual who signed checks and decided when creditors were paid was personally
liable as an ERISA fiduciary).
51 Ryan McParland, ERISA: A Statute’s History, Purposes, and Progression, NY ST. BAR ASS’N: L.
STUDENT CONNECTION (June 1, 2011, 7:46 PM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/lawstudentconnection/2011/06/
erisa_history_purposes_and_pro.html.
52 Health Plans & Benefits, supra note 48.
47
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disposition of its assets.”53 An ERISA fiduciary can also be any individual
exercising “discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan.”54
Since “[t]he text of ERISA does not give a relevant definition for what
constitutes an ‘asset’ of an ERISA fund,” courts have had to develop the
proper rule and are divided as to whether unpaid contributions can be plan
assets.55 When unpaid contributions are classified as plan assets under ERISA,
“officers of the nonpaying corporation with control and authority over the
unpaid contributions may be held liable for the amount of nonpayment.”56 As
this section will discuss, once the court recognizes unpaid contributions as plan
assets, the individual in charge of contributing to the employee benefit funds is
considered a “fiduciary” under ERISA and therefore held personally liable for
the unpaid contributions.
1. The Second Circuit
In Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry &
Construction, the Second Circuit held an individual personally liable as an
ERISA fiduciary for unpaid contributions to the employee benefit plans.57 In
that case, Moulton Masonry & Construction, LLC entered into a CBA with the
Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers Pension Fund.58 This agreement required
the company to make contributions to the pension funds.59 Duane Moulton, the
sole owner, officer, and shareholder of the company, signed the agreement,
reported the employees’ working hours to the pension fund, and acted in
connection with the auditor.60 A few years after the agreement’s execution, the
pension fund requested a payroll audit pursuant to the terms of the agreement,
but the company refused to cooperate, and the district court entered a default
judgment against the company and Mr. Moulton.61 Eventually, the company
complied with the requests from the pension fund’s auditor, and the auditor

53

29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2012).
Id. § 1002(21)(A)(iii). An individual who “renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation,
direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or
responsibility to do so” is also a fiduciary for ERISA purposes. Id.
55 Hall, 334 F.3d at 1013.
56 Id. at 1012.
57 779 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2015).
58 Id. at 184.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 185.
61 Id.
54
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determined the company owed $451,300.52 in unpaid contributions to the
pension funds.62 Shortly thereafter, the district court granted the pension fund’s
motion for default judgment against the company and Mr. Moulton, holding
each jointly and severally liable.63 The defendants appealed and argued, in
relevant part, that questions of fact existed as to their liability for the unpaid
contributions to the pension funds.64
In determining whether the company was liable for the unpaid
contributions, the court looked to the language of § 515 of ERISA, which
states that “any employer who is obligated to make contributions to a
multiemployer plan . . . under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement
shall . . . make such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions
of . . . such agreement.”65 The court also noted that under ERISA, “if such an
employer fails to make the required contributions, the court ‘shall award the
plan’: ‘unpaid contributions,’ ‘interest,’ ‘liquidated damages provided for
under the plan,’ ‘attorney’s fees and costs,’ and ‘such other legal or equitable
relief the court deems appropriate.’”66 The court held the company was liable
to the pension fund under ERISA because of the terms governing the
agreement.67
With respect to Mr. Moulton’s liability, however, the district court
refrained from explicitly stating why it also found Mr. Moulton personally
liable for the unpaid contributions.68 The court reasoned that “because no []
evidence suggested that the individual and corporate defendant are alter egos,
Moulton could not have been found to be an ‘employer’ under Section 515 of
ERISA.”69 Section 409 of ERISA, however, “provides an independent basis for
Moulton’s liability in his individual capacity as a ‘fiduciary.’ A fiduciary,
under ERISA is ‘someone who exercises any discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of [an ERISA benefit] plan or
exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its
assets.’”70 When a fiduciary withholds plan assets, he becomes “personally
62

Id.
Id.
64 Id. at 185–86.
65 Id. at 187–88 (citing 29 U.S.C.§ 1145 (2012)).
66 Id. at 188 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1145.
70 Moulton Masonry, 779 F.3d at 188 (quoting Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2009)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i))).
63

GRIFFIN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

12/15/2016 3:16 PM

FIGHTING AN UPHILL BATTLE

323

liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan.”71 While not all
corporate officers and executives are fiduciaries under ERISA, those who
“determin[e] which of the company’s creditors w[ill] be paid or in what
order” are considered fiduciaries.72
Mr. Moulton was the sole owner, officer, and shareholder of the company.73
In this capacity, Mr. Moulton decided which creditors the company would pay,
and he “exercised control over money due and owing” to the pension funds.74
Thus, because Mr. Moulton both controlled the company’s finances and
personally failed to make the monetary contributions owed to the pension
funds, the court held that Mr. Moulton was indeed an ERISA fiduciary and
thus liable to the pension fund for the unpaid contributions classified as plan
assets under the agreement.75
2. The Eleventh Circuit
In ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, the Eleventh Circuit, when confronted with
a slightly different set of facts, determined that an individual could be held
liable as a fiduciary for the unpaid contributions only when the governing
agreement clearly stated that the unpaid contributions were plan assets.76 In
that case, H&R Services entered into a CBA with a union.77 Under the
agreement, the company promised to make contributions to the employee
pension fund.78 Like the company in Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, the
company in this case also failed to make the contributions.79 In response, the
union filed suit against the company, and the district court granted summary
judgment to the union.80 When the company failed to comply with the court’s
order, the union sued Roger and Hope Hall directly, the company’s general
manager and president, respectively.81 The issues on appeal were whether
unpaid contributions can be classified as plan assets, and, if so, whether the

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)).
Id. (quoting Finkel, 577 F.3d at 86).
Id. at 185.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 188–89.
334 F.3d 1011, 1014 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1012.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Halls were imputed fiduciary duties and therefore personally liable for the
unpaid contributions.82
In resolving whether the unpaid contributions were plan assets, the court
noted that “unpaid employer contributions are not assets of a fund unless the
agreement between the fund and the employer specifically and clearly declares
otherwise.”83 The Halls argued that the unpaid employer contributions were not
plan assets because the terms “Pension Fund” and “Fund” were defined in the
agreement as “all property of every kind held or acquired under the provisions
of [the] instrument.”84 The Halls therefore contended that the unpaid
contributions were incapable of being “held” or “acquired” by the fund
because they were unpaid.85 Unpersuaded, the court declined to limit the
definition of “acquire” solely to physical possession of the contributions.86
Since the plan contractually owns or controls the unpaid contributions by
nature of the agreement, the court found that the unpaid contributions could
fall within the scope of the term’s definition.87 In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied on the dictionary definition of “acquire,” which means “to come
into possession or ownership of . . .” and Black’s Law Dictionary definition of
the term as “[t]o gain possession or control of . . . .”88 Since the agreement
must specifically and clearly articulate that unpaid contributions were intended
to be plan assets, however, the court continued its analysis of the agreement.89
The “Establishment of Fund” section of the agreement stated, in relevant
part,
the [] Fund . . . shall be comprised of all monies received and held by
the Trustees from employer contributions . . ., all income from
investments made and held by the Trustees, . . . or any other property
received and held or receivable by the Trustees for the uses and
purposes set forth in th[e] agreement.90

82

Id. at 1012–13.
Id. at 1013.
84 Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 18 (2d ed. 1987) (emphasis
added); Acquire, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added)).
89 Id.
90 Id. (emphasis added).
83
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In this case, the argument turned on the last clause of that section.91
After reviewing both parties’ arguments, the court determined that both
interpretations had merit.92 Since an agreement must specifically and clearly
articulate that unpaid contributions were intended to be classified as plan
assets, the court stated that “a person should not be attributed fiduciary status
under ERISA and held accountable for performance of the strict
responsibilities required of him in that role, if he is not clearly aware of his
status as a fiduciary.”93 Thus, while the court acknowledged that ERISA
deserves broad construction, it was not willing to construe the statute so
broadly that it would impute fiduciary duties to an individual without notice
when he or she did not contract for such responsibility.94 The court remanded
the case to the district court so the parties could engage in discovery and
argument for purposes of determining contractual intent.95 With this opinion,
the Eleventh Circuit effectively took the stance that parties get what they
contract for—nothing more and nothing less.
While courts generally do not consider unpaid contributions by employers
to be plan assets,96 many plan documents define plan assets to include all
required contributions—even ones set to be made at a future date.97 For this
reason, both the Second and Eleventh Circuits found that when an agreement
specifically defines an employee benefit fund to include future unpaid
contributions by employers, then the unpaid contributions are plan assets.98
Further, in such circumstances, individuals who possess authority and control
91

Id.
Id. at 1015. The union argued that because receivable property is property of the fund, and unpaid
contributions are receivable, the unpaid contributions are clearly plan assets. Id. at 1014. However, Mr. and
Mrs. Hall argued that the unpaid contributions were not plan assets because they were not “received and held”
by the trustees. Id. at 1015. According to the Halls, the provision that “any other property received or held or
receivable by the Trustees” did not apply to “employer contributions” because the agreement addressed the
“asset-status” of employer contributions in a separate category preceding that provision. Id. In response, the
union argued that “any other property received or held or receivable by the Trustees” was a “catch-all
provision” that covered “all other property” not otherwise classified as an asset under the agreement—i.e.,
unpaid employer contributions. Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1016.
96 See Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1233, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
97 James McElligott Jr. & Robert Wynne, Ninth Circuit: Multiemployer Plan Calling Unpaid
Contributions “Plan Assets” Does Not Make Persons Controlling Contribution Payments ERISA Fiduciaries,
JD SUPRA BUSINESS ADVISOR (Aug. 13, 2015), www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ninth-circuit-multiemployerplan-44468/.
98 See Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry & Constr., LLC, 779 F.3d 182,
184 (2d Cir. 2015); Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012.
92
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over the plan assets are imputed fiduciary duties under ERISA and held
personally liable for the unpaid contributions.99
B. ERISA’s Application in Bankruptcy Proceedings
When the circuit courts have decided these issues within the bankruptcy
context, however, they have completely abandoned the aforementioned
reasoning and further muddled the law surrounding ERISA.100 If unpaid
contributions are classified as plan assets, and an individual exercising
authority or control over those assets is imputed fiduciary status under ERISA,
those unpaid contributions could be considered a nondischargeable debt in
bankruptcy.101 For the reasons discussed below, however, courts have refrained
to give “fiduciary” a consistent meaning under both ERISA and the Code.
While the Code does not specifically define “fiduciary,” some courts have
held that “if an individual is a fiduciary for purposes of ERISA, [then] the
individual is also treated as a fiduciary for purposes of § 523(a)(4).”102 Other
courts, however, take a more limited approach in recognizing fiduciary status
within the bankruptcy context because of their apprehension surrounding the
notion of unpaid contributions as nondischargeable debts for individual
debtors.103 As this section will show, three circuit courts have either improperly
declined to classify unpaid contributions as plan assets or refrained from
imposing ERISA fiduciary status to the individual in an attempt to protect the
debtor.104
1. The Sixth Circuit
In Board of Trustees v. Bucci (In re Bucci), the Sixth Circuit determined
this issue within the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.105 Charles Bucci,
president and sole shareholder of Floors by Bucci, signed a CBA on behalf of
his company, requiring it to make monthly contributions to the employees’
pension fund.106 After failing to make the required contributions for more than
99

See Moulton Masonry, 779 F.3d at 184; Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012.
See, e.g., Bos v. Bd. of Trs., 795 F.3d 1006, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015); In re Bucci, 493 F.3d 635, 637 (6th
Cir. 2007); In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2005).
101 See McElligot & Wynne, supra note 97.
102 Bos, 795 F.3d at 1008 (citing Blyler v. Hemmeter (In re Hemmeter), 242 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir.
2001)).
103 Id. at 1011.
104 See, e.g., Bos, 795 F.3d at 1007; In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 637; In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1197.
105 493 F.3d at 637.
106 Id. at 637–38.
100
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a year, Mr. Bucci filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in his individual
capacity and listed in his schedules a $99,000 debt to the pension fund for
unpaid contributions.107 In response, the trustee, on behalf of the fund, filed an
adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court seeking a declaration that the
unpaid contributions should not be discharged.108
Mr. Bucci was the only officer and director of his company; made all
corporate decisions; and did not separate his corporate and personal finances.109
Thus, the plan trustee argued Mr. Bucci was the alter ego of his company and,
as such, his failure to make the required contributions was a “defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity” under § 523(a)(4) of the Code.110 Even though
Mr. Bucci conceded that he was the alter ego of his company, the court stated
that a “defalcation is limited to situations where the parties to a creditor-debtor
relationship intend for the debtor to act as a trustee of the monies owed.”111
The bankruptcy court held that § 523(a)(4) did not apply because Mr. Bucci
was not a fiduciary of the unpaid contributions.112 While it was undisputed that
Mr. Bucci was contractually obligated to make the contributions, the evidence
did not show that Mr. Bucci acted as a trustee.113 The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s decision, determining ERISA did not apply under the
premise that “being a fiduciary under ERISA’s broad definition of that term is
not enough” to impute fiduciary status to an individual in a bankruptcy
proceeding.114
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit had to consider whether the unpaid
contributions were a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(4) since Mr. Bucci
had previously conceded to being the alter ego of his company and therefore
potentially liable for the unpaid contributions.115 The court defined
107

Id.
Id. at 637.
109 Id. at 638.
110 Id. at 637; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012).
111 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 638. The Sixth Circuit noted the bankruptcy court’s reliance on Sixth Circuit
precedent that limited § 523(a)(4) “to only those situations involving an express or technical trust relationship
arising from placement of a specific res in the hands of the debtor.” In re Bucci, No. 05-10195, 2006 WL
4458363, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2006) (quoting Commonwealth Land Title Co. v. Blaszak (In re
Blaszak), 397 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting R.E. Am., Inc. v. Garver (In re Garver), 116 F.3d 176,
180 (6th Cir. 1997))), aff’d sub nom. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio Carpenters’ Pension Fund v. Bucci, 351 B.R. 876
(N.D. Ohio 2006), aff’d sub nom. In re Bucci, 493 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2007).
112 Id. at 637.
113 Id. at 638.
114 Id. at 639.
115 Id.
108
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“defalcation” as “encompass[ing] not only embezzlement and misappropriation
by a fiduciary, but also the ‘failure to properly account for such funds.’”116 A
debt is nondischargeable as a defalcation when the evidence shows: “(1) a
preexisting fiduciary relationship; (2) breach of that fiduciary relationship; and
(3) a resulting loss.”117 The court stated that it “construes the term ‘fiduciary
capacity’ found in the defalcation provision of § 523(a)(4) more narrowly than
the term is used in other circumstances.”118
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co.,
in which the Court determined that an individual may be a fiduciary if he or
she was a trustee before the “act of wrongdoing,”119 the Sixth Circuit noted that
the defalcation provision applies only to “those situations involving an express
or technical trust relationship arising from placement of a specific res in the
hands of the debtor.”120 To show that an express or technical trust relationship
exists, a creditor must demonstrate: “(1) an intent to create a trust; (2) a trustee;
(3) a trust res;121 and (4) a definite beneficiary.”122 The court also noted that it is
possible for a statute to create a trust for purposes of § 523(a)(4) if it “defines
the trust res, imposes duties on the trustee, and those duties exist prior to any
act of wrongdoing.”123
Implementing this analysis, the plan trustee argued that ERISA created an
express trust because the employer contributions, classified as plan assets
under ERISA, created the necessary trust res.124 Further, Mr. Bucci was an
ERISA trustee because “he exercised control over the assets by choosing to not
pay the contributions.”125 Lastly, ERISA imposed managerial duties on Mr.
Bucci because it required him to hold the plan assets for his employees’
benefit.126
116 Id. (quoting Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Interstate Agency, Inc. (In re Interstate Agency), 760 F.2d
121, 125 (6th Cir. 1985)).
117 Id. (quoting In re Blaszak, 397 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2005)).
118 Id. (quoting In re Blaszak, 397 F.3d at 391).
119 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934).
120 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 639–40 (quoting In re Garver, 116 F.3d 176, 178 (6th Cir. 1997)); see Davis,
293 U.S. at 333.
121 Res, commonly referred to as corpus, is “[t]he property for which a trustee is responsible; the trust
principal.” Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
122 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 640 (quoting In re Blaszak, 397 F.3d at 391–92).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.; see also Moore v. LaFayette Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 416, 438 (6th Cir. 2006) (defining an ERISA
fiduciary as an individual “who exercises discretionary control or authority over a plan’s management,
administration, or assets”).
126 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 640.

GRIFFIN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

12/15/2016 3:16 PM

FIGHTING AN UPHILL BATTLE

329

In assessing this argument, the court made two important determinations.
First, the court noted that neither of the lower courts addressed whether the
employer contributions were indeed plan assets under ERISA.127 Following the
logic of the Eleventh Circuit, however, the court assumed the employer
contributions were plan assets because Mr. Bucci and the pension fund’s
agreement specifically provided that “contributions due to be received are
assets belonging to the fund.”128
Second, the court pointed out that the plan trustee did not argue the
agreement itself made Mr. Bucci a trustee, but rather Mr. Bucci was an ERISA
fiduciary because he exercised authority and control over the plan assets when
he actively chose not to pay the contributions.129 The court found this reasoning
to be flawed and problematic because for a trust relationship to satisfy
§ 523(a)(4), the fiduciary “must have duties that preexist the act creating the
debt.”130 Mr. Bucci’s breach of his contractual obligation to make the employer
contributions was simultaneously the act that created the debt and the exercise
of control; therefore, Mr. Bucci was an ERISA fiduciary.131 Thus, the trust
relationship “spr[ung] from the act from which the debt arose,” and it therefore
failed to create an express or technical trust for purposes of § 523(a)(4).132
The court declined to extend ERISA’s broad interpretation of fiduciary to
the defalcation provision.133 In bankruptcy proceedings, the court emphasized
that individual debtors have “only a contractual obligation to pay the employer
contributions,” which is not enough to trigger the fiduciary component of the
defalcation provision.134 Thus, the unpaid contributions were a dischargeable
debt in Mr. Bucci’s bankruptcy proceeding.

127

Id. at 642.
Id.; see ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011, 1013 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Traditionally, the proper
rule, developed by caselaw, is that unpaid employer contributions are not assets of a fund unless the agreement
between the fund and the employer specifically and clearly declares otherwise.”).
129 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 643.
130 Id.; see Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934); Carlisle Cashway, Inc. v. Johnson
(In re Johnson), 691 F.2d 249, 252 (6th Cir. 1982).
131 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 643.
132 Id.
133 Id. But see In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “ERISA satisfies the
traditional requirements for a statutory fiduciary to qualify as a fiduciary under § 523(a)(4)”).
134 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d at 643.
128
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2. The Tenth Circuit
In Navarre v. Luna (In re Luna), the Tenth Circuit also addressed this issue
within the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.135 In In re Luna, the Tenth
Circuit determined that the unpaid contributions were a dischargeable debt in
the debtor’s bankruptcy.136 Joyce and Mark Luna each owned 50% of Luna
Steel Erectors. Ms. Luna was the company’s president, secretary, and recordkeeper, and Mr. Luna was the company’s vice president.137 Ms. Luna, acting as
owner of the company, entered into a CBA with a local union, which obligated
the company to make monthly contributions to the pension funds.138 As with
the other cases, the financial state of the company weakened, and the Lunas
failed to make the required contributions.139
In an effort to keep the company afloat, Ms. Luna withdrew $43,000 from
her IRA and $7,000 in savings bonds and deposited it into the company bank
account.140 Further, Mr. Luna took out a personal loan for $30,000 and lent it to
the company.141 These cash advances proved to be futile, and the company was
unable to reimburse the Lunas.142 Out of options, the Lunas agreed to dissolve
the company.143 Their growing financial obligations forced each of them to file
chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions in their individual capacities.144 At the time of
their filing dates, more than $120,000 was owed to the pension funds.145 In
response, the plan trustee filed suit in the United States Bankruptcy Court
seeking a declaration that the Lunas be held personally liable for the unpaid
contributions, and that the debt be classified as nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(4).146 Since the Lunas exclusively managed the plan assets, they
exercised the necessary authority and control required to subject them to
fiduciary status under ERISA.147 The plan trustee asserted this classification

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

406 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1197.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1198; see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012).
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was enough for the Lunas also to be treated as fiduciaries under the defalcation
provision.148
The bankruptcy court disagreed, finding the unpaid contributions were not
plan assets. The court found the plan trustee’s argument to be incomplete
because “while ERISA imposes fiduciary obligations under § 523(a)(4) of the
Code, [] unpaid contributions do not constitute plan assets.”149 Since unpaid
contributions must be classified as plan assets to trigger ERISA fiduciary status
in this context, the court held that the Lunas had not engaged in defalcation,
and the debt should be discharged in bankruptcy.150 The plan trustee appealed,
and the district court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court.151
After the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision,152 the
Tenth Circuit addressed two issues: (1) whether unpaid plan contributions were
plan assets; and (2) whether the Lunas were fiduciaries.153 First, the plan trustee
argued that “unpaid contributions become plan assets at the time they become
due and owing.”154 The Lunas, however, asserted that their obligation to make
contributions was purely contractual because “contributions owed to the
Pension Fund did not become plan assets until they [were] paid to it.”155
Since ERISA does not define what establishes an “asset” of an ERISA
fund, the court began its analysis by looking at the plain meaning of the term
“asset.”156 The court turned to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “Asset”
as “(1) an item that is owned and has value; (2) the entries on a balance sheet
showing the items of property owned, including cash, inventory, equipment,
real estate, accounts receivable, and good will; (3) all the property of a person
available for paying debts.”157 The court interpreted the definition to mean “the
person or entity holding the asset has an ownership interest in a given thing,

148

In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1198.
Id. The plan trustee argued that the Lunas had engaged in “fraud or defalcation” while acting in a
fiduciary capacity because they generated some income and incurred personal expenses during the time period
that they failed to make the required contributions to the pension funds. Id. at 1197.
150 Id. at 1198.
151 Id.
152 Id. (finding that “unpaid contributions do not become plan assets until they have been paid into
particular funds”).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 1199.
157 Id. (quoting Asset, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 112 (7th ed. 1999)).
149
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whether tangible or intangible.”158 To determine ownership interest, the court
next looked to the common law of property.159
While an ERISA plan does not have a “present interest” in the unpaid
contributions until they are actually paid and received by the plan, it does hold
a “future interest” in the “collection of the contractually-owed
contributions.”160 The court held the district court erred in finding that the
unpaid contributions were not plan assets under ERISA.161 While its method
departed from the Eleventh Circuit’s “contractual language approach,” the
court recognized that “in some cases reference to the plan documents will aid
in the determination of what constitutes a plan asset.”162 In this case, the
language in the agreement concerning whether unpaid contributions were plan
assets was unclear.163 With this reasoning, the court created a novel
interpretation of plan assets by recognizing them as the “contractual right to
collect the unpaid contributions” instead of the unpaid contributions
themselves.164
Next, the court determined that the Lunas were not ERISA fiduciaries. In
reaching this conclusion, the court had to consider whether the Lunas
“exercise[d] any authority or control respecting management or disposition of
[plan] assets.”165 The court made two important findings in this assessment.
First, the court stated: “The act of failing to make contributions to the funds
cannot reasonably be construed as taking part in ‘management’ or ‘disposition’
of a plan asset.”166 Since the court recognized the plan asset to be the
contractual right to collect the unpaid contributions, not the unpaid
contributions themselves, “[i]t is the Trustees, not the Lunas, who control the
contractual right to collect unpaid contributions from the Lunas.”167

158

Id.
Id.; see U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Office of Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs (ERISA), Advisory
Opinion No. 93-14A (May 5, 1993) (“The assets of a plan generally are to be identified on the basis of
ordinary notions of property rights under non-ERISA law. In general, the assets of a welfare plan would
include any property, tangible or intangible, in which the plan has a beneficial ownership interest.”).
160 In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1199.
161 Id. at 1200.
162 Id. at 1200–01.
163 Id. at 1201.
164 Id. at 1204 (explaining that “even if the [plan] asset were the unpaid contributions themselves, it is still
not clear that the statutory definition [of an ERISA fiduciary] would be met . . . there were never any
earmarked funds or segregated account for the contributions.”).
165 Id. at 1201; see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2012).
166 In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1204.
167 Id. at 1206.
159
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Second, the court determined that the Lunas’ sole discretionary choice to
not make the required contributions was insufficient to impose fiduciary
status.168 The Lunas “exercised no control over how the Trustees manage[d] or
dispose[d] of that asset;”169 their only duty under the agreement was to make
the monthly contributions.170 The Lunas’ decision to use what money they had
to pay other business expenses instead of contributing to the pension funds
“was a business decision [and] not a breach of fiduciary duty.”171 The court
therefore held that the Lunas were “merely debtors” and not ERISA
fiduciaries.172 Thus, the unpaid contributions were a dischargeable debt in
bankruptcy.173
3. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit is the most recent circuit to address the issue, and the
court opted to follow the approaches of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits. In Bos v.
Board of Trustees, Gregory Bos was the president and owner of Bos
Enterprises.174 Mr. Bos, on behalf of the company, entered into the Carpenters’
Master Agreement, which required the company to contribute monthly
payments to the pension funds.175 Soon afterward, Mr. Bos struggled
financially and failed to make the required contributions.176 Mr. Bos signed a
promissory note personally guaranteeing the unpaid contributions, totaling
$359,592.09.177 After Mr. Bos failed to make payments on the note, the board
of trustees filed a grievance against Mr. Bos and the company to recover the
unpaid contributions, and an arbitrator awarded the board $504,282.59.178 Mr.
Bos and his spouse then filed a joint chapter 7 petition, and the board filed a
complaint against Mr. Bos contesting the dischargeability of the $504,282.59
in unpaid contributions under § 523(a)(4).179

168

Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1204.
170 Id. at 1206.
171 Id. at 1207–08 (emphasizing that the Lunas were trying to keep their company afloat in the face of
depleting finances and were forced to prioritize which financial obligations were most important).
172 Id. at 1204–05.
173 Id. at 1208.
174 795 F.3d 1006, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1008.
177 Id.
178 Id. While Mr. Bos did make one payment for $30,824.99 after signing the note, the remaining
outstanding balance went unpaid. Id.
179 Id.
169
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Mr. Bos personally controlled the money that was contractually required to
be paid to the pension funds under both the agreement and the promissory
note.180 Since the agreement “defined the funds as including contributions
‘required . . . to be made’ to the funds,” the bankruptcy court concluded that
the unpaid contributions were plan assets.181 Thus, the court held that Mr. Bos
“had committed defalcation while acting as a fiduciary of the funds and [] the
$504,282.59 debt to the funds was therefore nondischargeable.”182 The district
court subsequently affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court on the same
grounds.183 Mr. Bos appealed and argued that he was not a fiduciary under the
defalcation provision.184
The Ninth Circuit, following the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, stated, “For
a debt to be held nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4)’s defalcation provision,
the debtor must have been a fiduciary prior to his commission of the fraud or
defalcation.”185 The act that created the debt therefore cannot be the same act
creating the fiduciary relationship.186 Further, in this circuit, “[i]f an individual
is a fiduciary for purposes of [ERISA], the individual is also treated as a
fiduciary for purposes of § 523(a)(4).”187
The court also determined that the unpaid contributions were not plan
assets,188 ignoring the decisions of its district courts and adopting the reasoning
from the Sixth and Tenth Circuits.189

180

Id. at 1009.
Id.
182 Id. at 1008.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.; see In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001).
188 The Ninth Circuit has “consistently held that unpaid contributions by employers to employee benefit
funds are not plan assets.” Bos, 795 F.3d at 1009; see Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200
F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). However, several district courts within the Ninth Circuit have deviated from
the precedent set in Cline when “the plan document expressly defines the fund to include future payments.”
Bos, 795 F.3d at 1009; see Bd. of Trs. v. River View Constr., No. C-12-03514 PJH DMR, 2013 WL 2147418,
at *6, 18 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (concluding that “when the plan document defined the fund as including ‘all
contributions required . . . to be made,’ unpaid contributions were plan assets”); Trs. of the S. Cal. Pipe Trades
Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Temecula Mech., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (concluding
that “when the plan document defined the fund as including money ‘due and owing to the fund by the
employers,’ unpaid contributions were plan assets”). Under these circumstances, the courts have imputed
ERISA fiduciary status to employers based upon their “control over unpaid contributions to the fund[s].” Bos,
795 F.3d at 1009.
189 Bos, 795 F.3d at 1011–12.
181
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In an attempt to avoid the problem of the same act creating both the
wrongdoing and the fiduciary status, the board argued that “[the plan] asset
could be classified as amounts which the employer must eventually contribute
to the plan, but which are not yet due.”190 The court rejected this argument,
however, because “until the time payment is due, the plan does not actually
possess the money, and in fact has no present right to it.”191 The plan asset is
more appropriately classified as “the contractual right to bring a claim against
the employer for delinquent payments if the payments are in fact never
made.”192
The court further noted that even if the language in the agreement and the
promissory note dictated that unpaid contributions be classified as plan assets,
the defalcation provision would remain inapplicable because Mr. Bos lacked
control over the plan assets prior to his default.193 Since neither the company
nor Mr. Bos ever exercised control over the plan assets, the court held that “the
unpaid contributions to employee benefit funds are not plan assets [and] [Mr.]
Bos did not engage in defalcation for purposes of § 523(a)(4).”194 Thus, the
unpaid contributions were a dischargeable debt in bankruptcy.195
The key issue here that courts seem to be misunderstanding is that the
extension of the reasoning purported by both the Second and Eleventh Circuits
does not necessarily mean that every fiduciary debtor who finds himself or
herself in such an unfortunate situation will be slammed with nondischargeable
debt.196 One of the fundamental goals of the bankruptcy system is “[to give] the
honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting
debt.”197 The fresh start is an important social policy; however, courts should
not construe it so broadly that we throw away our ability to hold dishonest
debtors accountable for their misdeeds against others.

190

Id. at 1011.
Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1012.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 See Chao v. Duncan (In re Duncan), 331 B.R. 70, 82 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[Not] every debt
arising from or related to an ERISA violation by an ERISA fiduciary will be excepted from discharge by
Section 523(a)(4).”).
197 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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II. ANALYSIS
Courts should adopt a three-step approach to determine whether an
employer’s unpaid contributions to employee benefit funds are dischargeable
in bankruptcy. First, courts should treat CBAs like other contractual
agreements and enforce provisions that designate employer contributions as
plan assets. This Comment will demonstrate that while a collectively bargained
agreement for a multiemployer pension plan is different from a typical
contractual agreement, the normal rules and guidelines of contract law still
apply. Where the provisions of a contract are unclear, courts try to determine,
and enforce, the intent of the parties. Courts should apply the same principles
of contract interpretation in these scenarios and find that where a CBA clearly
designates employer contributions as plan assets, parties to the agreement
intended for that provision to be fully upheld.
Second, in a bankruptcy proceeding, courts should presume the term
“fiduciary” is consistent in both ERISA and the Code. Third, courts should
adopt the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the defalcation provision. This
Comment will demonstrate that this narrow reading provides an avenue of
relief for employees who have been wronged by dishonest debtors while
simultaneously preserving an honest debtor’s fresh start in bankruptcy.
This three-step approach will bring clarity to an already muddled and
complex area of the law and ensure that dishonest debtors are held accountable
under § 523(a)(4) for their willful and conscious disregard of the fiduciary
duties owed to dependent employees.
A. Courts Should Defer to the Intent of the Parties
1. Collective Bargaining Agreements Are “Super Contracts”
When a CBA specifically defines that all employer contributions are plan
assets, courts should preserve contractual intent. The Supreme Court has stated
that “a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract.”198 In fact,
“the collective agreement may have more ‘contractualness’ than many other
bargained transactions.”199 The collective agreement is not a standard contract
used purely to sell a commodity or ensure the repayment of a loan.200 Instead,
198
199
200

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964).
Clyde W. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525, 534 (1969).
See id.
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one multiemployer agreement often binds hundreds of employers and their
employees while simultaneously guiding the parties through an ongoing
employment relationship and covering many facets of their particularized
industry.201 Thus, “the collective agreement is pre-eminently an instrument of
private planning, and its qualities of complexity and continuity reflect the
importance of its planning function.”202 In fact, “[w]hen measured against the
complexity of the relationship they govern, collective agreements provide
more detailed planning and make more complete provision for contingencies,
both foreseen and unforeseen, than many of the commercial contracts . . . .”203
In other words, CBAs are “super contracts” because of their complexity
and the number of people they affect. When problems arise under a CBA, the
ramifications are huge because of the number of people affected.204 The
employer and the individuals representing the employees must carefully
negotiate and plan the terms that will govern for many years to come—
potentially even decades.205
Despite the parties’ best efforts to be meticulous, however, the resulting
CBA “cannot possibly provide for the myriad of variant situations which might
arise” because of “the diverse congeries of matters” that the agreement
covers.206 Since CBAs contemplate nearly every aspect of the employment
relationship,207 a faulty or ambiguous provision does not lead to an end of the
agreement or relationship. The parties must remedy the problem so the show
can go on.
Because of the nature of CBAs, if an agreement clearly states that plan
assets include unpaid contributions, then the language in the agreement should
govern. In an atmosphere filled with “pressures to reach a settlement,” courts
should take the unambiguous language of a CBA at face value so the parties
can better focus on the inevitable gaps and ambiguities that may give rise to
extensive litigation.208 The majority of litigation surrounding CBAs arises
because “the officers of the union, or management, or both, are unwilling to

201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

See id. at 528.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 535.
See id. at 529.
See id. at 530.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 528.
See id. at 529.
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accept responsibility for agreeing to an inescapable result.”209 But, “[i]t is not
the province of the court to rewrite an agreement to rectify an ambiguity, to
avoid hardship to a party, or because one party has become dissatisfied with its
terms.”210 When courts interpret CBAs, “the traditional rules of contract
interpretation apply as long as they are consistent with federal labor
policies.”211 Since “[t]he text of ERISA does not give a relevant definition for
what constitutes an ‘asset’ of an ERISA fund,” the natural next step, therefore,
is for the courts to defer to the intent of the parties.212
2. Unpaid Contributions Are Plan Assets when Accompanied with Clear
Language
Despite the general rule that unpaid contributions are not plan assets,213 we
have seen that five circuits214 have either classified unpaid contributions as plan
assets or hypothesized the possibility that unpaid contributions could be plan
assets under certain circumstances. The hesitation of full recognition arises
when a bankruptcy proceeding accompanies the issues at hand.215 This
hesitation is unwarranted, however, since courts can evaluate each issue
individually before deciding whether to hold a debtor liable for defalcation.
Because the first step in a bankruptcy case involving a debtor’s unpaid
contributions is to determine whether the delinquent contributions are plan
assets, courts should adopt the reasoning of the Second and Eleventh Circuits
and simply look to the governing agreement for clear, specific language that
classifies unpaid employer contributions as plan assets.216 This determination is
important because ERISA provides fiduciary responsibilities for those
managing and controlling plan assets.217 If the language is present, then the
209

Id. at 536.
Young v. Anne Arundel Cty., 146 Md. App. 526, 587 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
211 Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 91 v. United Tech. Corp., 230 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2000).
212 See ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011, 1013 (11th Cir. 2003).
213 See Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1233, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
214 See Bos v. Bd. of Trs., 795 F.3d 1006, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015); Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local
2 v. Moulton Masonry & Constr., LLC, 779 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Bucci, 493 F.3d 635, 637 (6th
Cir. 2007); In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2005); Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012.
215 See Bos, 795 F.3d at 1007.
216 See, e.g., Hall, 334 F.3d at 1012; Trs. of Constr. Indus. v. Archie, No. 2:12–CV–225 JCM (VCF),
2014 WL 846498, at *4 (D. Nev. 2014) (holding that unpaid contributions were plan assets based upon the
language in the agreement); Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F. Supp. 295, 301 (M.D. Penn. 1987) (declaring that the
“clear and undisputed language [of the agreement] stating [] title to all monies ‘due and owing’ the plaintiff
fund is ‘vested’ in the fund,” thereby classifying “any delinquent employer contributions vested assets of the
plaintiff fund”).
217 Health Plans & Benefits, supra note 48.
210
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unpaid contributions are plan assets. If the language is not present, then the
default rule218 prevails; the unpaid contributions are not plan assets; and the
inquiry ends.
With this approach in mind, “[t]rustees seeking to maximize the trust
fund’s ability to collect employer contributions should explicitly define in the
plan documents and agreements with employers that plan assets include all
unpaid employer contributions in the hands of the employer.”219 While the
recognition of unpaid contributions as plan assets places “heavy
responsibilities on employers,” it only does so “to the extent that . . . an
employer freely accept[ed] those responsibilities in collective bargaining.”220
Indeed, many plan documents define plan assets to include all required
contributions. A court’s progression to step two infra is therefore highly
likely.221
This approach would produce two benefits. First, not only does this
approach provide clarification for courts by offering a hard line rule for
determining whether unpaid contributions are plan assets, but it also spares
employees and employers from having to dedicate time, energy, and resources
to litigation over unambiguous contract language. Second, this method is
consistent with the traditional rules of contract interpretation, which require
courts to give deference to the unambiguous language of an agreement.222 It is
clear, then, that courts should adopt a different approach when determining the
dischargeability of a debtor’s unpaid contributions, but this step is just the first
in this inquiry.

218 See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN 2008-1 1
(Feb. 1, 2008) (“Employer contributions become an asset of the plan only when the contribution has been
made.”).
219 Neal S. Schelberg & Aaron J. Feuer, Fiduciary Liability for Unpaid Employer Contributions, 51
BENEFITS MAG., Aug. 2014, at 42, 45, http://www.ifebp.org/inforequest/ifebp/0165697.pdf.
220 Hall, 334 F.3d at 1014 (citing NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund ex rel. Capo v. Catucci, 60 F.
Supp. 2d 194, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
221 See McElligott Jr. & Wynne, supra note 97.
222 See M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 929 (2015); see also WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS, § 30:6 (4th ed. 2009) (“When a collective-bargaining agreement is unambiguous, its meaning
must be ascertained in accordance with its plainly expressed intent.”).
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B. Presumption of Consistent Usage of “Fiduciary” Under ERISA and the
Code
Second, courts should presume the term “fiduciary” is consistent in both
ERISA and the Code in a bankruptcy proceeding.223 This section proceeds in
three parts. First, it will examine what it means to be an ERISA fiduciary and
explain how the circuit courts have applied the guiding language of ERISA in
nonbankruptcy proceedings. Second, it will discuss what it means to be a
fiduciary under the Code and assess how the circuit courts have refrained from
imputing ERISA fiduciary status to debtors in bankruptcy proceedings. Third,
it will argue that courts should presume that “fiduciary” has a consistent
meaning under both ERISA and the Code.
1. ERISA: Construing “Fiduciary” Broadly
After determining that unpaid contributions are plan assets, courts should
next assess whether the individual is an ERISA fiduciary. Each employee
benefit fund must appoint “one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or
severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation and
administration of the plan.”224 Aside from these designated fiduciaries,
“individuals may acquire fiduciary status if they exercise the fiduciary
functions set forth [under ERISA].”225 Recall that ERISA defines a “fiduciary”
as an individual who “exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary
control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its asset.”226
Further, an ERISA fiduciary can also be any individual exercising
“discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of
such plan.”227 The common activities of ERISA fiduciaries include “providing
223 While this section ultimately argues for a presumption of consistent usage for the term “fiduciary,” the
best way for parties to avoid this part of the analysis in court is to obligate the individuals who will be making
the employer contributions to take on fiduciary duties within the contract. If the contract explicitly names these
individuals as fiduciaries, then there will be no need for further discussion, and the court can proceed to step
three infra. See In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Assessing whether a person is a named
fiduciary under the terms of a plan is, of course, a straightforward inquiry. Deciding whether a person has
assumed functional or de facto fiduciary status, however, is a more difficult exercise.”). This Comment will
assume, however, that the individuals charged with making employer contributions were not designated as
fiduciaries in the governing agreement.
224 29 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
225 In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1201; see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
226 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i).
227 Id. § 1002(21)(A)(iii).
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investment advice, administrative control over a plan, advising on whom to
retain as legal or investment advisors to a plan, and, ultimately, how to invest
plan assets.”228 Thus, the relevant question becomes whether the owner, or
potentially any officer or executive, exercised “control and authority” over the
unpaid contributions.229 If so, then the individual satisfies the requirements of
an ERISA fiduciary and becomes personally liable for the unpaid
contributions.230
The circuit courts are inconsistent in determining what forms of conduct
constitute exercising “control and authority” over unpaid contributions, as
decisions from the Second and Eleventh Circuits demonstrate. In Bricklayers
& Allied Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry & Construction, the
Second Circuit found that an individual exercises control or authority when
that individual knowingly “determin[es] which of the company’s creditors
w[ill] be paid or in what order.”231 Thus, if the individual controlling the
company’s finances fails to make the monetary contributions owed to the
funds, then the individual has sufficiently exercised control or authority over
the unpaid contributions.232 That individual will therefore be held liable for the
debt as an ERISA fiduciary.233
In ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to
the district court to determine whether the parties intended for unpaid
contributions to be plan assets.234 The court noted, however, that it would have
followed an approach similar to the Second Circuit’s in Moulton Masonry if
the contractual language had clearly stated that unpaid contributions were plan
assets.235

228

In re Luna, 406 F.3d at 1201; see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142–43
(1985) (stating that ERISA fiduciary duties “relate to the proper management, administration, and investment
of fund assets, the maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and the avoidance of
conflicts of interest”).
229 See ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011, 1012 (11th Cir. 2003); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
230 See Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry & Constr., LLC, 779 F.3d 182,
188 (2d Cir. 2015).
231 Id. (quoting Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 86 (2d. Cir. 2009)).
232 See id. at 189.
233 Id.
234 See Hall, 334 F.3d at 1016 (“If the district court finds that this section was clearly intended by the
parties to make unpaid employer contributions assets of the Fund, then summary judgment . . . is not
appropriate.”).
235 See id.
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2. The Code: Construing “Fiduciary” Narrowly
While the Code does not define “fiduciary,” the Supreme Court in Davis v.
Aetna Acceptance Co. mandated that the term be construed “strict[ly] and
narrow[ly].”236 Thus, unlike ERISA’s broad definition of “fiduciary,” the term
has a much more limited meaning under the Code’s defalcation provision.237
Because the receipt of a discharge is essential for facilitating a debtor’s fresh
start, courts narrowly construe exceptions to discharge under the Code.238
Commentators have interpreted Davis to provide “the framework for
determining whether a debt arises from a fiduciary relationship that satisfies
the fiduciary-capacity element of § 523(a)(4).”239 The Court stated, “[i]t is not
enough that by the very act of wrongdoing out of which the contested debt
arose, the bankrupt has become chargeable as a trustee ex maleficio. He must
have been a trustee before the wrong and without reference thereto.”240 In other
words, bankruptcy law demands that an individual’s fiduciary status predate
any wrongdoing or debt that arises because of an action by the individual. The
creation of the debt or an act of wrongdoing does not itself make the individual
a fiduciary for purposes of § 523(a)(4).
In contrast, the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have taken a drastically
different approach when deciding the fiduciary status of a debtor in
bankruptcy.241 The Tenth Circuit in In re Luna, when given the first
opportunity to examine this issue in the bankruptcy context, declined to use the
language governing the agreement to determine step one: the status of unpaid
contributions; the court turned to the principles of property law instead.242 In
doing so, the court still found that the unpaid contributions were plan assets,
but only because the ERISA plan possessed “a future interest in the collection
236 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934); see also Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844) (holding that a factor
who retains the money of his principal is not a fiduciary debtor under bankruptcy law because the law “speaks
of technical trusts and not those which the law implies from contract”). See generally Emil Khatchatourian &
Brendan M. Gage, Unpaid ERISA Contributions and Fiduciary Liability Under § 523(a)(4), 32 AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Nov. 2013 at 52, Westlaw, 32-Nov. Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 52.
237 Khatchatourian & Gage, supra note 236, at 52.
238 See In re Stone, 91 B.R. 589, 591 (D. Utah 1988) (“A central purpose of bankruptcy legislation is to
provide the debtor with comprehensive relief from the burden of his debts by discharging virtually all financial
obligations. Therefore, courts have narrowly construed exceptions to discharge in favor of the debtor in order
to not frustrate this fundamental policy . . . .”).
239 Khatchatourian & Gage, supra note 236, at 52.
240 Davis, 293 U.S. at 333; see also Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U.S. 365, 378 (1891) (“The language would
seem to apply only to a debt created by a person who was already a fiduciary when the debt was created.”).
241 See Bos v. Bd. of Trs., 795 F.3d 1006, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2015); In re Bucci, 493 F.3d 635, 643 (6th
Cir. 2007); In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005).
242 406 F.3d at 1199.
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of the contractually owed contributions.”243 Thus, when deciding if an
individual debtor exercised authority or control over the unpaid contributions,
the court held that such a finding would be improbable.244
By this logic, the trustees of the plan, not the debtor, controlled the
contractual right to collect the unpaid contributions from the debtor.245 The
plan trustees’ right to “enforce their contractual rights is entirely up to [them];
the [debtors], meanwhile, have no say over whether this right will be enforced
or not.”246 In reaching this decision, the court stated that “ERISA’s definition
of ‘fiduciary’ is broad but . . . Congress did not intend [for discretion alone to
trigger fiduciary status], for it would . . . undermine the very purpose of ERISA
by creating an enormous disincentive to offer an employee-benefit fund or
contract with one.”247
Two years later, the Sixth Circuit in In re Bucci advanced the notion that a
debtor’s status as an ERISA fiduciary is different from its status as a fiduciary
under the defalcation provision of the Code.248 The court determined that to be
a fiduciary under § 523(a)(4), “the alleged fiduciary must have duties that
preexist the act creating the debt.”249 Thus, while an individual’s decision to
refrain from making required payments to the funds is enough to trigger
fiduciary status under ERISA, this decision, without more, is unable to make
the debtor a fiduciary for purposes of § 523(a)(4).250 This interpretation of
“fiduciary” is consistent with the court’s long history of “constru[ing] the term
‘fiduciary capacity’ found in the defalcation provision of § 523(a)(4) more
narrowly than the term is used in other circumstances.”251
In 2015, the Ninth Circuit in Bos v. Board of Trustees agreed with the
Tenth Circuit’s holding in In re Luna by finding that unpaid contributions are
“more appropriately classified as the contractual right to bring a claim against
the employer for delinquent payments if the payments are in fact never
made.”252 Thus, the “control or authority” over the asset belongs to the plan

243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252

See id.
See id. at 1202.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1208.
493 F.3d 635, 643 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 639.
Bos v. Bd. of Trs., 795 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2015).
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trustees, not the employer.253 Further, and coinciding with the court’s “limited
approach . . . in recognizing fiduciary status . . . in the § 523(a)(4) context,” it
also found merit in the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, which distinguished the
definition of an ERISA fiduciary from a fiduciary for purposes of
§ 523(a)(4).254
3. Two Become One
Because the fundamental purpose of bankruptcy law is to facilitate a fresh
start for the honest but unfortunate debtor, scholars have argued that “[t]he
Davis fiduciary analysis must be distinguished from ERISA’s definition of a
fiduciary.”255 While this argument has merit, it ultimately threatens and
disfavors the protections afforded to employees under ERISA. Thus, the issue
necessarily becomes one of reconciliation. What are courts to do in the face of
conflicting federal laws and social policies? While “[t]here is no way to predict
with certainty how the Court [would] resolve a conflict between competing
federal laws . . . [t]he resolution of this conflict usually depends on whether the
majority of Justices view the question presented primarily from the perspective
of bankruptcy law or non-bankruptcy law.”256 The Supreme Court should view
the “fiduciary conflict” primarily from the perspective of ERISA.257 In other
words, the Court should insist on a presumption of consistent usage for the
term “fiduciary” for purposes of ERISA and the Code to give employees an
opportunity to fight another day in this uphill battle.
In recent decades, “the [Supreme] Court has decided a few cases resolving
the conflict between bankruptcy law and pension law.”258 While both laws
serve important policies and functions, the Court “has uniformly resolved these
conflicting policies in favor of the pension law . . . .” In Patterson v. Shumate,
the Court held that “an ERISA-qualified pension plan may be excluded from

253

See id. at 1011–12.
See id. at 1011.
255 Khatchatourian & Gage, supra note 236, at 52. But see In re Fahey, 482 B.R. 678, 695 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.
2012) (“[W]here the debt arises from an ERISA fiduciary acting in his fiduciary capacity under that statute,
then § 523(a)(4)’s ‘fiduciary capacity’ requirement will be met.”); In re Duncan, 331 B.R. 70, 82 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[I]t seems reasonable and appropriate to look to ERISA’s definition of a fiduciary in order to
assess whether the requirement of fiduciary capacity has been met.”).
256 KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 60 (2008).
257 See In re Duncan, 331 B.R. at 82 (“[I]t is routine to give meaning to Bankruptcy Code terms by
reference to non-bankruptcy law.”). See infra discussion step three, applying § 523(a)(4) and ultimately
determining whether the unpaid contributions will be a nondischargeable debt.
258 KLEE, supra note 256, at 80.
254
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the property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 541(c)(2).”259 While this
decision undoubtedly limits a creditor’s ability to reach a debtor’s assets, the
Court’s ruling preserves an individual’s retirement benefits. This holding is
“consistent with both bankruptcy and ERISA policies” because, in theory, a
creditor will benefit from the assets that comprise property of the debtor’s
estate.260 The Court’s opinion effectively furthered three important ERISA
polices: “[1] no exceptions to ERISA’s anti-alienation provisions; [2] ERISA’s
goal of protecting pension benefits; and [3] uniform national treatment of
pension benefits.”261 The third policy the Court listed is by far the most
important ERISA goal, for without uniform national treatment of pension
benefits, we regress as a society and fail the American worker.262
Courts’ insistence on separating the meaning of fiduciary in the bankruptcy
context from its meaning under ERISA is unnecessary and confusing. On the
one hand, it is important for courts to construe § 523(a)(4) narrowly. When an
individual employer files for bankruptcy, certainly “Congress [did not mean] to
impose fiduciary obligations on all employer-contributors.”263 In bankruptcy,
“unless [the debtor] has violated some norm of behavior specified [under the
Code],” the law attempts to contrive the best way for the parties involved to
move forward.264 Thus, “the principal advantage bankruptcy offers an
individual lies in the benefits associated with discharge.”265 If the court
deprives a debtor of a discharge, then it robs the debtor of the opportunity to
rebuild.
On the other hand, “it is important to have a uniform interpretation of
federal law.”266 While bankruptcy law contains its own unique set of
circumstances, procedures, and policies, there is no need for “fiduciary” to
have a different meaning within this context. “Uniform treatment . . . by both
state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to
discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving ‘a windfall
merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.’”267 Thus, courts should
259

504 U.S. 753, 765 (1992).
KLEE, supra note 256, at 88; see Patterson, 504 U.S. at 758.
261 KLEE, supra note 256, at 88; see Patterson, 504 U.S. at 764–65 (emphasis added).
262 See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text.
263 In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1208 (10th Cir. 2005).
264 Jackson, supra note 23, at 1393.
265 Id.
266 Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (2013).
267 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609
(1961)).
260
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extend the reasoning of both the Second and Eleventh Circuits so that the
ERISA definition of “fiduciary” is preserved in the bankruptcy context. In
other words, “being an ERISA fiduciary is sufficient to satisfy the fiduciary
capacity requirement of § 523(a)(4).”268
It is important to remember that Congress, “prompted by public outcry over
inadequacies in the private pension system, enacted ERISA as a means of
protecting employees’ retirement income.”269 ERISA’s objectives are “to
increase the number of pension plan participants and to assure that participants
receive their benefits.”270 To achieve this goal, “ERISA’s declared policy is to
protect the interests of participants through the creation of standards for
disclosure, fiduciary obligations, vesting, funding and plan termination
insurance.”271 ERISA is a broad, remedial statute that addresses violations with
both civil remedies and criminal penalties.272 Thus, to declare that contract law
is an employee’s best and only means to receive unpaid contributions
undermines the very purpose of ERISA and the efforts of Congress in passing
such a complex and remedial statute.
By giving ERISA the broad interpretation it deserves, courts should
consider an individual who possesses the ability to refrain from making
payments owed to the funds an ERISA fiduciary. When such an individual
neglects to pay the funds, and, in turn, directs the money elsewhere, he or she
is absolutely “exercis[ing] . . . discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or . . . disposition of its asset.”273 While
this broad interpretation undoubtedly places great responsibility on employers,
it does so only “to the extent that . . . an employer freely accept[ed] [such a
responsibility] in collective bargaining.”274 If, after weighing the risks, the
employer does not wish to take on such responsibility, then the employer
should, during the bargaining process, object to the inclusion of any language
in the agreement classifying unpaid contributions as plan assets. As indicated
268 In re Bucci, 493 F.3d 635, 640 (6th Cir. 2007); see In re Hemmeter, 242 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that “an ERISA fiduciary is also a fiduciary under § 523(a)(4)”); see also In re Duncan, 331 B.R. 70,
82 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005); Weaver v. Weston (In re Weston), 307 B.R. 340, 343 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2004);
Morgan v. Musgrove (In re Musgrove), 187 B.R. 808, 814 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).
269 Gail Cagney, Note, Corporate Officers as Employers: Eristic Liability Under ERISA, 52 BROOK. L.
REV. 1211, 1212 (1987).
270 Id. at 1214.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 1215.
273 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2012).
274 ITPE Pension Fund v. Hall, 334 F.3d 1011, 1014 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical
Servs. Fund ex rel. Capo v. Catucci, 60 F. Supp. 2d 194, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
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in step one, if unpaid contributions are not plan assets, then the delinquent
employer cannot be imputed fiduciary duties within this context. Thus, this
approach increases employees’ chances of receiving the money owed to their
retirement accounts, while also protecting employers from an overarching
statute assigning liability not agreed upon by the parties.275
Assigning fiduciary status to an individual who has knowingly failed to
make contributions to employee benefit funds does not, in and of itself, make
that individual’s debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy.276 Thus, as the Supreme
Court noted in Patterson, such a construction would be “consistent with both
bankruptcy and ERISA policies.”277 This broader definition of fiduciary simply
safeguards the purpose of ERISA, which is to ensure that employees receive
the benefits they deserve.278 Under this approach, courts can and should
prevent debtors who willfully breached279 fiduciary duties to their employees
from having the unpaid contributions discharged in bankruptcy. At the same
time, courts will remain able to protect the honest debtor from his creditors
because of the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the defalcation provision
discussed in the next section.
C. The Defalcation Provision and Nondischargeable Debts
The third and final step for courts to determine is whether the debtor is
liable for defalcation. To reach this point, the court must have done two things:
(1) found unambiguous language in the CBA that makes unpaid contributions
plan assets; and (2) preserved the definition of fiduciary under ERISA by
275 See id. at 1015 (quoting Herman v. NationsBank Tr. Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1366 (11th Cir. 1997)). The
court stated:

If ERISA did not limit the definition of fiduciaries to those with knowledge of their authority and
discretion, then persons or entities could become subject to fiduciary liability without notice.
Such a result would not only be unfair, but it would also disserve a core purpose of ERISA,
which is to create a system whereby accountable fiduciaries are motivated by their accountability
to protect the interests of participants in ERISA plans.
Id.
276 See In re Duncan, 331 B.R. 70, 82 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[I]n the Section 523(a)(4) context, it
seems reasonable and appropriate to look to ERISA’s definition of a fiduciary in order to assess whether the
requirement of fiduciary capacity has been met. This does not mean that every debt arising from or related to
an ERISA violation by an ERISA fiduciary will be excepted from discharge by Section 523(a)(4). But where
the debt arises from an ERISA fiduciary acting in his or her fiduciary capacity under the statute, then Section
523(a)(4)’s requirement that the debtor act in a fiduciary capacity will be met.”).
277 Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 (1992); see KLEE, supra note 256, at 88.
278 See Cagney, supra note 269, at 1214.
279 See Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013).
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extending it to the bankruptcy proceeding. In other words, the debtor has
knowingly refrained from making contributions to the employee benefit funds
and has been imputed fiduciary status under ERISA, which the court agrees to
recognize in bankruptcy. Courts should determine whether the debtor is liable
for defalcation on a case-by-case basis after evaluating the totality of the
circumstances and by keeping in mind the purposes of both ERISA and the
Code.280
Denying a discharge for a debt created by an individual’s improper conduct
has a long history in American jurisprudence.281 The term “defalcation” first
appeared in bankruptcy law in 1841 to prohibit the discharge of debts “created
in consequence of a defalcation as a public officer; or as executor,
administrator, guardian or trustee, or while acting in any other fiduciary
capacity.”282 In Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, Judge Learned
Hand famously stated: “Colloquially, perhaps the word, ‘[d]efalcation,’
ordinarily implies some moral dereliction, but in th[e] context [of the 1841
Act] it may have included innocent defaults, so as to include all fiduciaries
who for any reason were short in their accounts.”283 However, Judge Hand
noted that the Supreme Court in Chapman v. Forsyth limited the meaning of
fiduciary to “special” or “technical” fiduciaries.284
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 simplified the existing defalcation provision
to “defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary
character.”285 Additionally, the 1867 Act expanded the defalcation provision to
any “debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt” directly
before the defalcation provision.286 With these revisions, Judge Hand pondered
that “[w]hatever was the original meaning of ‘defalcation,’ it must here have
covered other defaults than deliberate malversations, else it added nothing to
280

See Cagney, supra note 269, at 1214; Jackson, supra note 23, at 1393 (“THE principal advantage
bankruptcy offers an individual lies in the benefits associated with discharge.”).
281 See Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937) (“Under the Act of 1800
. . . a discharge relieved bankrupts of all their debts without exception, provided they conducted themselves
properly; but the statute applied only to those engaged in commerce and was confined to involuntary
bankruptcies.”). In 1841, Congress extended this reasoning to voluntary bankruptcy proceedings. Id. (Ch. 9,
§ 4, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (1841) (repealed 1843) [hereinafter 1841 Act]).
282 Id. (citing 1841 Act, § 1, 5 Stat. at 441).
283 Id.
284 Id. (citing Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844)); see supra notes 236–240 and accompanying
text (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “fiduciary” for bankruptcy purposes).
285 Cent. Hanover Bank, 93 F.2d at 511 (emphasis added) (citing Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 33,
14 Stat. 517, 533 (amended 1874 and repealed 1878) [hereinafter 1867 Act]).
286 1867 Act, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. at 533; see Cent. Hanover Bank, 93 F.2d at 511.
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the words, ‘fraud or embezzlement.’”287 Thus, Judge Hand’s “interpretation of
defalcation created an ambiguity regarding the level of culpability required to
constitute defalcation.”288 Within the midst of such ambiguity, however, Judge
Hand presents a compelling argument that the standard for defalcation may
have been much broader than the narrow reading the provision receives from
courts today.
Congress enacted § 523(a)(4) of the Code to punish the dishonest debtor
and, when appropriate, this provision gives the court the ability to find that
debt arising from unpaid contributions is not dischargeable in a fiduciary
debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding.289 Section 523(a)(4) “does not discharge an
individual debtor from any debt for fraud or defalcation while acting in a
fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.”290 In Bullock v.
BankChampaign, N.A., the Supreme Court considered the scope of the term
“defalcation” and held that defalcation “includes a culpable state of mind
requirement akin to that which accompanies application of the other terms in
the same statutory phrase.”291 The Court described the state of mind
requirement “as one involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect
to, the improper nature of the relevant fiduciary behavior.”292 In other words,
“where the conduct at issue does not involve bad faith, moral turpitude, or
other immoral conduct, the term requires an intentional wrong.”293 Intentional
conduct is both “conduct that the fiduciary knows is improper [and] reckless
conduct of the kind that the criminal law often treats as the equivalent.”294 For
the conduct to be reckless, the fiduciary must engage in a conscious disregard
for, or willful blindness to, “a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that his
conduct “will turn out to violate a fiduciary duty.”295
The Court reasoned that this interpretation “is also consistent with a set of
statutory exceptions that Congress normally confines to circumstances where
strong, special policy considerations, such as the presence of fault, argue for
preserving the debt, thereby benefiting, for example, a typically more honest
287

Id.
Elizabeth Vanderlinde, Intentional Conduct May Be Required to Prove Defalcation Under Section
523(a)(4) in Certain Circuits, 4 ST. JOHN’S BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR. NO. 28, at 2 (2012).
289 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012); McElligott Jr. & Wynne, supra note 97.
290 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
291 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1757 (2013).
292 Id.
293 Id. at 1759.
294 Id.
295 Id.
288
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creditor.”296 The Court noted that “[i]n the absence of fault, it is difficult to find
strong policy reasons favoring a broader exception here.”297 Thus, a court
should find a debtor who was acting in a fiduciary capacity liable for
defalcation on a case-by-case basis after evaluating the totality of the
circumstances.
The bar for satisfying defalcation is high,298 and as such, an individual
employer who simply forgets to make one payment to an employee benefit
fund will not reach that bar. Since this Comment advocates for courts to take a
new approach when evaluating whether an individual debtor is guilty of
defalcation for failing to make contributions to employee benefit funds, it is
difficult to determine precisely what factors need to be present for a court to
declare the debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Arguably, an individual’s
decision to refrain from making the required payments to the funds is
intentional conduct that “the fiduciary knows is improper.”299 Bullock
demands, however, that the intentional conduct also be reckless of the kind
punishable by criminal law.300 Thus, this requirement is one that courts can use
to truly protect an honest but unfortunate debtor in bankruptcy.
In bankruptcy, courts should look for factors mitigating the debtor’s act of
nonpayment. Why is the debtor delinquent in making the required
contributions? Where did the money go instead? What does the financial
picture of the debtor’s business look like? When did events take a turn for the
worse? Has the debtor done anything to remedy the situation? If courts ask
questions such as these when determining if a debtor is guilty of defalcation,
they can discern a clearer picture of the debtor’s character and habits. Did the
debtor take his fiduciary duties seriously, or did he disregard completely any
responsibilities or obligations owed to the employee benefit funds for personal
gain? If the court determines the latter to be true, then it should hold the
debtor’s unpaid contributions nondischargeable in bankruptcy.301

296

Id. at 1761.
Id.
298 See id. at 1759.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 See id. at 1761 (stating that “circumstances where strong, special policy considerations, such as the
presence of fault, argue for preserving the debt, thereby benefiting, for example, a typically more honest
creditor”).
297
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CONCLUSION
This three-step approach preserves the contractual intent of the parties to
make unpaid contributions plan assets of multiemployer pension plans; gives
“fiduciary” a consistent meaning under both ERISA and the Code; and makes
unpaid contributions a nondischargeable debt when a court holds a dishonest
debtor liable for defalcation. While this three-step approach certainly will not
eliminate every problem in this ongoing battle, it will give employees an
opportunity to fight another day.302 If courts elect to adopt this approach,
trustees representing the employees must engage in a cost–benefit analysis to
determine if litigation is the correct course of action. There is no guarantee that
the debtor will be able to pay the employee benefit funds even if all three steps
set forth in this Comment are easily satisfied, for one cannot get blood from a
stone. This idiom unfortunately remains true even for the worst, most
despicable stones. Further, if the debtor can pay some money to the funds, will
the amount outweigh the costs of litigating the case? This is an important
question, but it is one every individual weighs before entering our judicial
system. The choice to litigate belongs to the people. When a court either
refuses to acknowledge an employer’s unpaid contributions as plan assets or
fails to extend ERISA’s definition of “fiduciary” to a bankruptcy proceeding, it
deprives the employee of his or her choice whether to litigate because he or she
will automatically lose every time. Thus, this three-step approach provides the
best chance for employees to receive unpaid contributions while
simultaneously furthering the purposes of ERISA and the spirit of the Code.
As of March 2015, “[e]mployer-provided retirement benefits were
available to 31% of private industry workers in the lowest wage category (the
10th percentile).”303 Further, “88 percent of workers in the highest wage
category (the 90th percentile) had access to retirement benefits.”304 These
employees count on their employers to hold up their end of the bargain and
make the required contributions to employee benefit funds. If employers fail to
do so, then the aggrieved employees have no choice but to rely on the courts
for the justice they deserve. In a society where 55% of Americans “break even
or spend more than they make each month,” the majority of households “do
302

See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91
YALE L.J. 857, 858 (1982) (“[T]he claimants who fare best in the bankruptcy process hold special entitlements
under applicable non-bankruptcy law.”).
303 John Sullivan, Two-Thirds of Workers Have Access to Retirement Benefits: DOL, 401KSPECIALIST
(July 29, 2015), https://401kspecialistmag.com/two-thirds-of-workers-have-access-to-retirement-benefits-dol/.
304 Id.
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not consider themselves ready for a sudden financial setback.”305 Thus, when
courts (1) reject the language in agreements classifying unpaid contributions as
plan assets, (2) fail to extend the definition of an ERISA fiduciary to the
bankruptcy context, or (3) ultimately find the dishonest fiduciary not guilty of
defalcation, they may be facilitating more bankruptcy filings—ones filed by
the employees because of their employer’s disregard for his or her fiduciary
duties.
A court may ultimately find that the fiduciary debtor did not engage in a
conscious disregard for, or willful blindness to, “a substantial and unjustifiable
risk” that would cause the debtor to breach a fiduciary duties and be guilty of
defalcation.306 In fact, perhaps the debtor is a sympathetic debtor like Joyce and
Mark Luna who “turned over for [the company’s] benefit approximately
$43,000 from [a personal] IRA . . . $7,000 in savings bonds, none of which
[the company] ever repaid . . . and a $30,000 [personal loan] from a local
bank” in attempts to keep the company afloat for everyone involved.307 In a
situation like this one, it would be illogical to hold the debtor’s large debts
arising from unpaid contributions nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4).
Sometimes, unforeseen financial tragedies occur despite our best efforts. The
Code exists for this reason—“to grant a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate
debtor.”308
But, “it is unlikely that Congress would have fashioned a proof standard
that favored an interest in giving the perpetrators of fraud a fresh start over an
interest in protecting the victims of fraud.”309 Not all fiduciary debtors will be
as sympathetic as the Lunas. There will be, and likely have been, fiduciary
debtors who meet the defalcation standard laid out by the Supreme Court in
Bullock.310 They will possess “a culpable state of mind . . . involving
knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature of the
relevant fiduciary behavior” and will have engaged in “conduct that the

305 Associated Press, More than HALF of Americans still break even or live beyond their means each
month, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 27, 2015, 4:43 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2971021/Pew-studyAmericans-stressed-despite-improved-economy.html; see also Abby Hayes, Why You Should Never Try to
Keep Up with the Joneses, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.: MY MONEY (Apr. 10, 2015, 8:30 AM),
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/2015/04/10/why-you-should-never-try-to-keep-up-withthe-joneses (“Many Americans live beyond their means.”).
306 See Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759.
307 In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2005).
308 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).
309 Id. at 279.
310 See Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1757–59.
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fiduciary knows is improper.”311 It is a civil disservice for courts to
preemptively fail to extend the reasoning of the Second and Eleventh Circuits
to bankruptcy proceedings. If courts continue on this path, they will ensure that
fraudulent actions go unpunished because they will have eliminated the
employees’ avenue to hold fiduciary debtors accountable when the appropriate
fact patterns arise.
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